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Prisons and jails pose a significant challenge to the rule of law
within American boundaries. As a nation, we are committed to constitutional regulation of governmental treatment of even those who
have broken society’s rules. And accordingly, most of our prisons
and jails are run by committed professionals who care about prisoner
welfare and constitutional compliance. At the same time, for prisons—closed institutions holding an ever-growing disempowered
1
population —most of the methods by which we, as a polity, foster
government accountability and equality among citizens are unavailable or at least not currently practiced. In the absence of other levers
*
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by which these ordinary norms can be encouraged, lawsuits, which
bring judicial scrutiny behind bars, and which promote or even compel constitutional compliance, accordingly take on an outsize importance. Unfortunately, over the past twelve years, it has become apparent that a number of provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform
2
Act (“PLRA”) cast shadows of constitutional immunity, contravening
our core commitment to constitutional governance. The PLRA’s obstacles to meritorious lawsuits are undermining the rule of law in our
prisons and jails, granting the government near-impunity to violate
the rights of prisoners without fear of consequences.
This damage to the rule of law in America’s prisons is occurring
even as those prisons have grown in their importance—both because
of the nation’s increasing incarcerated population (the world’s larg3
est) and the sharpening international focus on American treatment
4
of prisoners, both domestically and abroad. Amendment is urgently
needed. In recent months numerous advocates and organizations
5
have urged reform. Indeed, a bill offered in the last Congress, the

2

3

4

5

Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.). The PLRA was part of the Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996 that ended the 1996 federal
government budget standoff.
Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2008, at A1
(reporting that the United States has the most prisoners of any nation in the world, including China); see also International Centre for Prison Studies, King’s College London,
World
Prison
Brief,
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/world
brief/wpb_stats.php?area=all&category=wb_poptotal (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); ROY
WALMSLEY, BRIT. HOME OFFICE, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (5th ed. 2003), available
at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs2/r234.pdf.
See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., America’s Abu Ghraibs, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at A17 (drawing
a connection between callous attitude towards domestic prisoners fostered by the PLRA
and abuse of detainees in Abu Ghraib); see also Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007: Hearing
on H.R. 4109 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of David Fathi, U.S.
Program
Director
of
Human
Rights
Watch),
available
at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/04/22/usdom18610.htm (explaining how the PLRA
violates U.S. treaty obligations).
See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RESOLUTION 102B (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2007/midyear/docs/SUMMARYOFRECOMMENDA
TIONS/hundredtwob.doc; COMMISSION ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS,
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 84–87 (2006), available at http://prisoncommission.org/
report.asp; Letter from the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n to Cong. Bobby Scott
and Cong. Randy Forbes, Chair and Ranking Minority Members, Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary (Jan. 24, 2008) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Letter from the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n].
Other statements are available at http://www.aclu.org/prison/restrict/32803
res20071115.html and at http://savecoalition.org/latestdev.html. See also Hearing, supra
note 4, available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/hearings/hear_042208.html.
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6

Prison Abuse Remedies Act, would offer some moderate fixes to the
most pressing problems created by the PLRA. In this Article, we discuss three of these problems. First, the PLRA’s ban on awards of
compensatory damages for “mental or emotional injury suffered
7
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury” has obstructed judicial remediation of religious discrimination, coerced sex,
and other constitutional violations typically unaccompanied by physical injury, undermining the regulatory regime that is supposed to
prevent such abuses. Second, the PLRA’s provision barring federal
lawsuits by prisoner plaintiffs who have failed to comply with their
jails’ or prisons’ internal grievance procedures—no matter how difficult, futile, or dangerous such compliance might be for them—
obstructs rather than promotes constitutional oversight of conditions
of confinement. It strongly encourages prison and jail authorities to
come up with ever-higher procedural hurdles in order to foreclose
subsequent litigation. Third, the application of the PLRA’s limitations to juveniles incarcerated in juvenile institutions has rendered
those institutions largely immune from judicial oversight because so
many young people are not able to follow the complex requirements
imposed by the statute, and compliance by their parents or guardians
on their behalf has been deemed legally insufficient. Each of these
three problems disrupts accountability and enforcement of constitutional compliance.
Below, we discuss these issues in some depth. But it is important
to mention in preface what we see as the primary salutary effect of the
PLRA—its lightening of the burdens imposed on jail and prison officials by frivolous litigation. Pro se prisoner lawsuits in federal court
are numerous, often lack legal merit, and pose real management
challenges both for courts and for correctional authorities. Congress
8
passed the PLRA in order to deal with this problem. This has in fact
occurred, in two ways. First, the PLRA has drastically reduced the
number of cases filed: prison and jail inmates filed twenty-six federal
cases per thousand inmates in 1995; the most current statistic, for
2006, was less than eleven cases per thousand inmates, a decline of

6

Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, H.R. 4109, 110th Cong., 1st Session (Nov. 7, 2007).

7

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).

8

See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1555–1627 (2003) [hereinafter Schlanger, Inmate Litigation]; see also Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over
Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) (discussing
the PLRA’s other purpose, to lessen court injunctive supervision of jails and prisons).
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9

60%. So the PLRA has been extremely effective in keeping down the
number of federal lawsuits by prisoners, even as incarcerated populations rise. Even more important than these sharply declining filing
rates for understanding the decreasing burden of litigation for prison
10
and jail officials are the statute’s screening provisions, which require
courts to dispose of legally insufficient prisoner civil rights cases without even notifying the sued officials of the suit against them and
without receiving any response from those officials. Prison or jail officials no longer need to investigate or answer complaints that are
frivolous or fail to state a claim under federal law.
But in addition to frivolous or legally insufficient lawsuits, there
are, of course, serious cases brought by prisoners: cases involving lifethreatening deliberate indifference by authorities to prisoner health
and safety; sexual assaults; religious discrimination; retaliation against
those who exercise their free speech rights; and so on. When the
PLRA was passed, its supporters emphasized over and over: “[We] do
not want to prevent inmates from raising legitimate claims. This legislation will not prevent those claims from being raised. The legislation will, however, go far in preventing inmates from abusing the
11
Federal judicial system.” Yet “prevent[ing] inmates from raising legitimate claims” is precisely what the PLRA has done in many instances. If the PLRA were successfully “reduc[ing] the quantity and
12
improv[ing] the quality of prisoner suits,” as its supporters intended,
one would expect the dramatic decline in filings to be accompanied
by a concomitant increase in plaintiffs’ success rates in the cases that
remain. The evidence is quite the contrary. The shrunken inmate

9

For 2007 filing statistics, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
UNITED STATES COURTS 2007, at 148 tbl.C-2A (2007) (prisoner civil rights, prison
conditions cases), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/appendices/C02
ASep07.pdf; for 1995 filing statistics, see ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 1999, at 139 tbl.C-2A (1999), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/c02asep99.pdf; and for prison population figures,
see Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 1.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) (2006).
141 CONG. REC. S14,627 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The crushing burden of these frivolous suits makes it difficult for the courts to consider meritorious
claims.”); see also 141 CONG. REC. S19,114 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Kyl) (“If we achieve a 50-percent reduction in bogus Federal prisoner claims, we will free
up judicial resources for claims with merit by both prisoners and nonprisoners.”); 141
CONG. REC. S18,136 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch); 141 CONG. REC.
H1480 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Canady) (“These reasonable requirements will not impede meritorious claims by inmates but will greatly discourage claims
that are without merit.”).
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002).
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docket is less successful than before the PLRA’s enactment; more
13
cases are dismissed, and fewer settle. An important explanation is
that constitutionally meritorious cases are now faced with new and often insurmountable obstacles. These obstacles are the topic of this
Article.
I. PHYSICAL INJURY
The PLRA provides that inmate plaintiffs may not recover damages for “mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody with14
out a prior showing of physical injury.” Given the commitment by
the Act’s supporters that constitutionally meritorious suits would not
be constrained by its provisions, perhaps the purpose of this provision
was the limited one of foreclosing tort actions claiming negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress unless they resulted in
physical injury, which might have otherwise been available to federal
15
prisoners under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Such an attempt to
limit what legislators may have considered to be frivolous or inconse16
quential claims would echo fairly common state law limitations on
17
tort causes of action.
Notwithstanding what may have been the limited intent underlying the physical injury requirement, its impact has been much more
sweeping. First, many courts have held that the provision covers all
18
violations of non-physical constitutional rights. Proven violations of

13
14
15

16
17

18

See Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, supra note 8, at 1644–64.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2006).
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), 2671–2680 (2006); see also United States v.
Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963) (allowing a Federal Tort Claims Act lawsuit by federal prisoners for personal injuries caused by the negligence of government employees).
See Jon O. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 519, 520 (1996).
See, e.g., Dale Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, Recovery Under State Law for Negligent Infliction
of Emotional Distress Under Rule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d
912 (1968), or Refinements Thereof, 96 A.L.R.5TH 107 § 6 (2002) (citing cases from nine
states).
See, e.g., Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that RLUIPA claim is
“limited” by PLRA physical injury requirement); Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 722–23
(8th Cir. 2004) (concluding that no compensation is available for retaliation for exercise
of free speech rights); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 416–17 (2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that no compensation is available for violation of due process rights); Searles v.
Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (concluding that no compensation is
available for violation of religious rights); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir.
2000) (concluding that no compensation is available for violation of religious rights);
Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that no
compensation is available for violation of constitutional privacy rights). But see Canell v.
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prisoners’ religious rights, speech rights, and due process rights have
all been held non-compensable, and thus placed largely beyond the
19
scope of judicial oversight. For example, in Searles v. Van Bebber, the
Tenth Circuit concluded that the physical injury requirement barred
a suit by a Jewish prisoner who alleged a First Amendment violation
based on his prison’s refusal to give him kosher food. This result is
particularly problematic in light of Congress’s notable concern for
prisoners’ religious freedoms. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), passed in 2000, states that “No
government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the
burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so
20
by “the least restrictive means.”
Moreover, although the case law is far from uniform, some courts
have deemed sexual assault not to constitute a “physical injury” within
21
the meaning of the PLRA. In Hancock v. Payne, a number of male
prisoners alleged that over several hours, a corrections officer sexually assaulted them. “Plaintiffs claim that they shared contraband
with [the officer] and that he made sexual suggestions; fondled their
genitalia; sexually battered them by sodomy, and committed other re22
lated assaults.” The plaintiffs further complained that the officer
“threatened Plaintiffs with lockdown or physical harm should the in23
cident be reported.” The district court granted summary judgment
24
in part to the defendants. One of the grounds for this defense vic25
tory was the physical injury requirement. The court said, “the plaintiffs do not make any claim of physical injury beyond the bare allega26
tion of sexual assault.” In other words, in the view of this district
court, not even coerced sodomy (which was alleged) constituted
physical injury. Though some other courts have decided the question differently, the Hancock court is not alone in reaching this con27
clusion. As with religious rights, this outcome exists in sharp ten-

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that PLRA “does not preclude
actions for violations of First Amendment rights”).
251 F.3d at 872, 876.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2) (2006).
No. 1:03-CV-671, 2006 WL 21751 (S.D. Miss. Jan 4, 2006).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
See, e.g., Smith v. Shady, No. 3:05-CV-2663, 2006 WL 314514, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 9, 2006)
(“Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint concerning Officer Shady grabbing his penis and
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sion with Congress’s recent efforts to eliminate sexual violence and
coercion behind bars by passing the Prison Rape Elimination Act of
28
2003.
Finally, in case after case, courts have held even serious physical
symptoms insufficient to allow the award of damages because of the
29
PLRA’s physical injury provision. In one case, a plaintiff alleged that
the defendant correctional officer “punch[ed the] Plaintiff repeatedly in his abdominal area, pushed Plaintiff’s head down and repeatedly punched Plaintiff with his right hand in the back of his head, hit
Plaintiff on his left ear, placed Plaintiff’s head between his legs and
grabbed Plaintiff around his waist and picked the Plaintiff up off the
30
ground and dropped Plaintiff on his head.” The plaintiff further alleged that he “sustained bruises on [his] left ear, back of [his] head
31
and swelling to the abdominal area of his body.” Nonetheless, the
district court held the claim insufficient under the PLRA’s physical
32
injury provision.
In another, burns to the plaintiff’s face were
deemed insufficient because those burns had “healed well,” leaving
33
“no lasting effect.”
Even when courts reject the defense that unconstitutional conduct
did not cause a physical injury, the PLRA emboldens prison and jail
officials to make objectionable arguments that must be litigated, forcing expenditure of resources and prolonging litigation, as well as further dehumanizing prisoners and promoting a culture of callous-

28
29

30
31
32
33

holding it in her hand do not constitute a physical injury or mental symptoms.”). But see
Liner v. Goord, 196 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that sexual assault constitutes
physical injury within the meaning of the PLRA). See generally Deborah M. Golden, It’s
Not All In My Head: The Harm of Rape and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 11 CARDOZO
WOMEN’S L.J. 37 (2004)
42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2006).
See Jarriett v. Wilson, 162 F. App’x 394, 396–98 (6th Cir. 2005) (concluding that inmate
confined for twelve hours in “strip cage” in which he could not sit down did not suffer
physical injury even though he testified that he had a “bad leg” that swelled “like a grapefruit” and that caused severe pain and cramps); Myers v. Valdez, No. 3:05-CV-1799, 2005
WL 3147869, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 17, 2005) (concluding that alleged “pain, numbness
in extremities, loss of mobility, lack of sleep, extreme tension in neck and back, extreme
rash and discomfort” did not satisfy PLRA physical injury requirement); Mitchell v. Horn,
No. 2:98-CV-4742, 2005 WL 1060658, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2005) (reported symptoms
including “severe stomach aches, severe headaches, severe dehydration . . . and blurred
vision,” suffered by inmate confined in cell allegedly “smeared with human waste and infested with flies” did not constitute physical injury for PLRA purposes).
Borroto v. McDonald, No. 5:04-CV-165, 2006 WL 2789152, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 26,
2006).
Id.
Id. at *1.
Brown v. Simmons, No. 6:03-CV-122, 2007 WL 654920, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2007).
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34

ness. Moreover, experienced civil rights attorneys hesitate to file
suits alleging many serious abuses (for example, on behalf of prisoners chained to their beds or subjected to sexual harassment by
guards), because they know that corrections officials will argue—and
often succeed in arguing—that compensatory damages are barred by
35
the PLRA.
The point is that the PLRA’s ban on awards of compensatory
damages for “mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury” has made it far more difficult for prisoners to enforce any non-physical rights—including freedom of religion and freedom of speech—and to seek compensation
for any mental rather than physical harm, no matter how intentionally, even torturously, inflicted. (This aspect of the law has, in fact,
convinced some courts to save the provision from constitutional in36
firmity by reading it not to bar relief. ) The PLRA has left the availability of compensatory damages for the constitutional violation of
coerced sex an open question. It has posed an obstacle to compensation even for physical violence, if the physical component of the injury is deemed insufficiently serious. It has thereby undermined the
important norms that such infringements of prisoners’ rights are unacceptable. Just as it contradicts constitutional commitments, the
PLRA is simultaneously obstructing Congress’s recent statutory efforts
34

35

36

See, e.g., Pool v. Sebastian County, 418 F.3d 934, 942–43, 943 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing the argument of the defendant jail officials that the stillbirth of a fetus of four to five
months gestational age over a jail cell toilet, preceded by days of bleeding, did not satisfy
PLRA physical injury requirement).
See Hearing, supra note 4, at 8 (statement of Stephen B. Bright, President and Senior
Counsel,
Southern
Center
for
Human
Rights),
available
at
http://www.judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Bright080422.pdf.
See Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811 (E.D. Mich. 2006), concluding that the “jury
was entitled to find that the Plaintiff suffered mental or emotional damages as a result of
Defendant’s violation of his First Amendment rights [because any] other interpretation
of § 1997e(e) would be . . . unconstitutional,” id. at 816, and noting:
The Court finds the following hypothetical, set forth in Plaintiff’s brief, to be persuasive:
[I]magine a sadistic prison guard who tortures inmates by carrying out fake
executions—holding an unloaded gun to a prisoner’s head and pulling the
trigger, or staging a mock execution in a nearby cell, with shots and
screams, and a body bag being taken out (within earshot and sight of the
target prisoner). The emotional harm could be catastrophic but would be
non-compensable. On the other hand, if a guard intentionally pushed a
prisoner without cause, and broke his finger, all emotional damages
proximately caused by the incident would be permitted.
Id. (alteration in original). See also Percival v. Rowley, No. 1:02-CV-363, 2005 WL 2572034,
at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2005) (“To allow section 1997e(e) to effectively foreclose a
prisoner’s First Amendment action would put that section on shaky constitutional
ground.”).
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to protect prisoners’ religious liberty, as well as freedom from sexual
abuse.
II. ADMINISTRATIVE EXHAUSTION
The PLRA’s exhaustion provision states: “no action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this
title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail,
prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative reme37
dies as are available are exhausted.” The provision appears harmless
enough. Who could object, after all, to a regime in which corrections
officials are given the first opportunity to respond to and perhaps resolve prisoners’ claims?
But in many jails and prisons, administrative remedies are, unfortunately, very difficult to access. Deadlines may be very short, for example, or the number of administrative appeals required may be very
38
39
large. The requisite form may be repeatedly unavailable, or the
grievance system may seem not to cover the complaint the prisoner
40
41
seeks to make. Prisoners often fear retaliation, and, although some
courts have recognized exceptions to the exhaustion requirement
42
based on estoppel or “special circumstances,” others have refused to
43
excuse prisoners’ lapses. Beginning six years after the PLRA’s en37
38

39

40

41
42
43

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006).
For a survey of prison and jail grievance policy deadlines, see Brief for Jerome N. Frank
Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 6–13 & A1–A7, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05-416), 2006 WL
304573 [hereinafter LSO Amicus Brief].
See, e.g., Latham v. Pate, No. 1:06-CV-150, 2007 WL 171792, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 18,
2007) (dismissing suit due to tardy exhaustion in case in which the prisoner who alleged
that he had been beaten maintained that he was placed in segregation and administrative
segregation immediately following assault and that “officers did not provide him with the
grievance forms”).
See, e.g., Benfield v. Rushton, No. 8:06-CV-2609, 2007 WL 30287, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 4,
2007) (dismissing suit due to untimely filing of grievance brought by prisoner who alleged that he was repeatedly raped by other inmates; prisoner had explained that he
“didn’t think rape was a grievable issue”); Marshall v. Knight, No. 3:03-CV-460, 2006 WL
3714713, at *1 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 14, 2006) (dismissing, for failure to exhaust, plaintiff’s
claim that prison officials retaliated against him in classification and disciplinary decisions, even though prison policy dictated that no grievance would be allowed to challenge
classification and disciplinary decisions).
See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 118 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Garcia v. Glover, 197 F. App’x 866, 867 (11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to excuse nonexhaustion in case in which inmate alleged that he had been beaten by five guards, despite the fact that prisoner alleged that he feared he would be “killed or shipped out” if
he filed an administrative grievance); Umstead v. McKee, No. 1:05-CV-263, 2005 WL
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44

actment, first some of the Courts of Appeals, and finally the Su45
preme Court, held that the PLRA forever bars even meritorious
claims from court if a prisoner has failed to comply with all of the
many technical requirements of the prison or jail grievance system.
This means that if prisoners miss deadlines that are often less than
46
fifteen days and in some jurisdictions as short as two to five days, a
judge cannot consider valid claims of sexual assault, beatings, or racial or religious discrimination. Moreover, the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement has been held to grant constitutional immunity to
prison officials based on understandable mistakes by pro se prisoners
operating under rules that are often far from clear. Wardens and
sheriffs routinely refuse to engage prisoners’ grievances because
those prisoners commit minor technical errors, such as using the in47
correct form, sending the right documentation to the wrong offi48
cial, or failing to file separate forms for each issue, even if the interpretation of a single complaint as raising two separate issues is the
49
prison administration’s. Each such misstep by a prisoner bars con50
sideration of even an otherwise meritorious civil rights action. Although dismissals are often without prejudice, prison grievance deadlines are so short that prisoners who failed to exhaust before filing
51
suit generally are unable return to court.

44
45
46

47
48
49
50

51

1189605, at *2 (W.D. Mich. May 19, 2005) (“[I]t is highly questionable whether threats of
retaliation could in any circumstances excuse the failure to exhaust administrative remedies.”).
See Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1023 (7th Cir. 2002).
Woodford, 548 U.S. 81.
Id. at 118 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]ime requirements . . . are generally no more than
15 days, and . . . , in nine States, are between 2 and 5 days.”); see also LSO Amicus Brief,
supra note 38.
See, e.g., Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001).
See, e.g., Keys v. Craig, 160 F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2005).
Harper v. Laufenberg, No. 3:04-CV-699, 2005 WL 79009, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Jan. 6, 2005).
See Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive Power:
Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 321 (2007)
(“In a survey of reported cases citing Woodford in the first seven months after it was decided, the majority [of cases in which the exhaustion issue was resolved] were dismissed
entirely for failure to exhaust. All claims raised in the complaint survived the exhaustion
analysis in fewer than fifteen percent of reported cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
See, e.g., Rohn v. Beard, No. 2:07-CV-783, 2007 WL 4454417, at *1 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (dismissing case because prisoner had filed an untimely grievance after his case was initially
dismissed for incomplete exhaustion); Regan v. Frank, No. 06-CV-66, 2007 WL 106537 at
*5 (D. Haw. 2007) (“Even though [the court] dismissed Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice to the filing of a new action following proper exhaustion, Ngo makes proper exhaustion of these claims impossible.”).
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For this reason, the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, a bipartisan commission appointed under the Prison Rape
52
Elimination Act of 2003, has warned that the PLRA exhaustion requirement can “frustrate Congress’s goal of eliminating sexual abuse
53
in U.S. prisons, jails, and detention centers.”
The Commission
wrote to the House Judiciary Committee that “[b]ecause of the emotional trauma and fear of retaliation or repeated abuse that many incarcerated rape victims experience, as well as the lack of confidentiality in many administrative grievance procedures, many victims find it
extremely difficult—if not impossible—to meet the short timetables
54
of administrative procedures.” To solve this problem, the Commission has proposed (in a working draft of regulatory standards) that
“Any report of sexual abuse made at any time after the abuse, which
names a perpetrator and is made in writing to the agency, satisfies the
55
exhaustion requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.”
Far from encouraging correctional officials to handle the sometimes frivolous but sometimes extremely serious complaints of inmates, the PLRA’s exhaustion rule actually provides an incentive to
administrators in the state and federal prison systems and the over
3,000 county and city jail systems to fashion ever higher procedural
hurdles in their grievance processes. After all, the more onerous the
grievance rules, the less likely a prison or jail, or staff members, will
have to pay damages or be subjected to an injunction in a subsequent
56
lawsuit. In fact, even when prison and jail administrators want to re-

52
53
54
55

56

42 U.S.C. §§ 15601–15609 (2006).
Letter from the Nat’l Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n, supra note 5.
Id.
National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, [Draft] Standards for the Prevention,
Detection, Response, and Monitoring of Sexual Abuse in Adult Prisons and Jails 33
(2008),
http://www.nprec.us/UpcomingEvents/5.1_MasterAdultPrison_andJail_and
ImmigrationStandardsClean.pdf. At the time this Article went to press, this draft standard had not yet been submitted to the U.S. Attorney General for approval as a final rule.
See National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, Standards and Comments,
http://www.nprec.us/standards.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
There is evidence that prisons and jails have headed in this direction. For example, in
July 2002, in Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of a case for failure to exhaust; in rejecting the defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s grievances were insufficiently specific, the court noted
that the Illinois prison grievance rules were silent as to the requisite level of specificity.
Less than six months later, the Illinois Department of Corrections proposed new regulations that provided:
The grievance shall contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s
complaint including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who
is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.
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solve a complaint on its merits, the PLRA discourages them from doing so, and therefore actually undermines the very interest in self57
governance Congress intended to serve. Can anyone reasonably expect a governmental agency to resist this kind of incentive to avoid
merits consideration of grievances? The officials in question are a
varied group—elected jailers and sheriffs, appointed jail superintendents, professional wardens, politically appointed commissioners.
What they all have in common is an understandable interest in avoiding adverse judgments against themselves or their colleagues.
Thus, by cutting off judicial review based on an inmate’s failure to
comply with his prison’s own internal, administrative rules—
regardless of the merits of the claim—the PLRA exhaustion requirement undermines external accountability. Still more perversely, it actually undermines internal accountability, as well, by encouraging
prisons to come up with high procedural hurdles, and to refuse to
consider the merits of serious grievances, in order to best preserve a
defense of non-exhaustion.
Moreover, courts have generally ignored Justice Breyer’s suggestion in his Woodford v. Ngo concurrence that “well established exceptions to exhaustion” from administrative law and habeas corpus doc58
trine be implemented in the PLRA context. Under ordinary
administrative law, exhaustion is not required where it would be fu59
tile —for example, if an aggrieved party seeks damages in a case
where no other kind of relief is applicable, but the administrative
process is not empowered to award damages. But the Supreme Court
has held that the PLRA forecloses a futility exception to its exhaus60
tion requirement. Likewise, ordinary administrative law waives exhaustion requirements where delay in judicial review imposes a hard61
ship on the plaintiff. But most courts have held that the PLRA
allows no emergency exception from the exhaustion requirement. As
one court put it, “The PLRA does not excuse exhaustion for prisoners who are under imminent danger of serious physical injury, much

57

58
59
60
61

ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810(b) (2008); see 26 Ill. Reg. 18065, at § 504.810(b) (Dec.
27, 2002) (proposing amendment).
In fact, if an agency chooses to entertain an untimely grievance that merits examination,
the agency is barred from asserting a failure-to-exhaust defense at later time. Riccardo v.
Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2004).
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 103–04 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 326–27 (1988); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n.6 (2001) (rejecting futility and other exceptions
for the PLRA).
See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148–49 (1967) (noting that determination
of ripeness requires a consideration of the “hardship to the parties”).
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less for those who are afraid to confront their oppressors.” A requirement of administrative exhaustion that punishes failure to cross
every t and dot every i by conferring constitutional immunity for civil
rights violations, and allows no exceptions for emergencies, is simply
unsuited for the circumstances of prisons and jails, where physical
harm looms so large and prisoners are so ill-equipped to comply with
legalistic rules.
Ideally, grievance systems actually improve agency responsiveness
and performance by helping corrections officials to identify and track
63
complaints and to resolve problems. Good grievance systems can
64
indeed reduce litigation by solving prisoners’ problems. But the
PLRA’s grievance provision instead encourages prison and jail officials to use their grievance systems in another way—not to solve problems, but to immunize themselves from future liability. Judicial oversight of prisoners’ civil rights is essential to minimize violations of
those rights, but the PLRA’s exhaustion provision arbitrarily places
constitutional violations beyond the purview of the courts.
It would be relatively simple to achieve the legitimate goal of allowing prison and jail authorities the first chance to solve their own
problems, yet to avoid the kinds of problems the PLRA has introduced. The exhaustion provision should not be eliminated, but
rather amended to require that prisoners’ claims be presented in
62

63

64

Broom v. Rubitschun, No. 1:06-CV-350, 2006 WL 3344997, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 17,
2006); see also, e.g., Williams v. CDCR, No. 2:06-CV-1373, 2007 WL 2384510, at *4 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) (“The presence of exigent circumstances does not relieve a plaintiff
from fulfilling this requirement.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2007 WL 2793117
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2007); Ford v. Smith, No. 1:06-CV-710, 2007 WL 1192298, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Apr. 23, 2007) (dismissing where plaintiff said his safety was in danger and he sought
a continuance until exhaustion was completed); Rendelman v. Galley, No. 1:06-CV-1999,
2007 WL 2900460, at *2 (D. Md. Feb. 15, 2007) (dismissing despite plaintiff’s claim of
imminent danger and request for a “protective order” pending exhaustion), aff’d, 230 F.
App’x 314 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 378 (2007); Aburomi v. United States,
No. 1:06-CV-3682, 2006 WL 2990362, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2006) (“It is understandable
that Plaintiff would want immediate treatment for a perceived recurrence of cancer, but
the administrative remedy program is mandatory regardless of the nature of the relief
sought.”).
See LYNN S. BRANHAM ET AL., AM. BAR ASSOC. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, LIMITING THE
BURDENS OF PRO SE INMATE LITIGATION: A TECHNICAL-ASSISTANCE MANUAL FOR COURTS,
CORRECTIONAL OFFICIALS, AND ATTORNEYS GENERAL (1997).
Dora Schriro, Correcting Corrections: Missouri’s Parallel Universe, in SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/181414.pdf; Dora Schriro, Director of the Ariz. Dep’t of Corrections, Correcting Corrections: The Arizona Plan: Creating Conditions for Positive Change in Corrections, Statement Before the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s Prisons
(Feb.
9,
2006),
available
at
http://www.prisoncommission.org/statements/
schriro_dora.pdf.
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some reasonable form to corrections officials prior to adjudication,
even if that presentment occurs after the prisons’ grievance deadline.
Cases filed with claims that have not been presented to prison officials could be stayed for a limited period of time, to allow corrections
officials an opportunity to address them administratively.
III. COVERAGE OF JUVENILES
The PLRA applies by its plain terms to juveniles and juvenile fa65
cilities. But prisoners under age eighteen were not the sources of
the problems the PLRA was intended to solve. Even before the
66
PLRA, juveniles accounted for very little prisoner litigation. This
dearth of litigation is not surprising. As the recent investigation into
alleged sexual abuse in the Texas juvenile system demonstrates, al67
though incarcerated youth are highly vulnerable to exploitation,
68
they generally are not in a position to assert their legal rights. Juvenile detainees are young, often undereducated, and have very high
69
rates of psychiatric disorders. Moreover, youth incarcerated in juvenile facilities generally do not have access to law libraries or other
sources of information about the law that might enable them to sue
more often. One court has even observed, “[a]s a practical matter,

65

66

67

68

69

18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(5) (2006) (“[T]he term ‘prison’ means any Federal, State, or local
facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced
for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.”).
Michael J. Dale, Lawsuits and Public Policy: The Role of Litigation in Correcting Conditions in
Juvenile Detention Centers, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 675, 681 (1998) (reporting that as of 1998,
“[t]here [were] less than a dozen reported opinions directly involving challenges to conditions in juvenile detention centers”).
Ralph Blumenthal, Investigations Multiplying in Juvenile Abuse Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2007, at A24; Ralph Blumenthal, One Account of Abuse and Fear in Texas Youth Detention,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2007, at A19; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, CUSTODY AND CONTROL: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN NEW YORK’S JUVENILE
PRISONS FOR GIRLS (2006), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/us0906/us0906
webwcover.pdf (detailing abuse in the New York girls’ juvenile prisons).
See Staci Semrad, Texas Ranger Tells of Prosecutor’s “Lack of Interest”, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2007, at A20, describing a sergeant in the Texas Rangers who investigated abuses at the
West Texas State School in Pyote, and told a legislative committee that he “saw kids with
fear in their eyes—kids who knew they were trapped in an institution that would never respond to their cries for help.” The sergeant said he was unable to convince a local prosecutor to take action.
LOURDES M. ROSADO & RIYA S. SHAH, PROTECTING YOUTH FROM SELF-INCRIMINATION
WHEN UNDERGOING SCREENING, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT WITHIN THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
5
(2007),
available
at
http://jlc.org/files/publications/
protectingyouth.pdf (“[S]ome large scale studies suggest that as many as 65%-75% of the
youth involved in the juvenile justice system have one or more diagnosable psychiatric
disorders.”).
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juveniles between the ages of twelve and nineteen, who, on average,
are three years behind their expected grade level, would not benefit
in any significant respect from a law library, and the provision of such
70
would be a foolish expenditure of funds.”
As with unincarcerated children, when juveniles do bring lawsuits,
or otherwise seek to remedy any problems they face behind bars, it is
very often their parents or other caretaking adults who take the lead.
It is, after all, parents’ ordinary role to try to protect their children.
But the PLRA’s exhaustion provision stymies such parental efforts, instead holding incarcerated youth to an impossibly high standard of
71
self-reliance. The case of Minix v. Pazera is a leading example of the
result. In Minix, a young man, S.Z., and his mother, Cathy Minix,
filed a civil rights suit for abuse that S.Z. endured while incarcerated
as a minor in 2002 and 2003 in Indiana juvenile facilities. While in
custody, S.Z. was repeatedly beaten, once with “padlock-laden
72
socks.” After one beating, he suffered a seizure, but no one helped
73
him, and he was beaten again the next day. He was raped and wit74
nessed another child being sexually assaulted. S.Z. was afraid to report the assaults to staff—and his fear was natural enough in light of
the fact that some of the staff were involved in arranging fights between juveniles, or would even “handcuff one juvenile so other juve75
nile detainees could beat him.”
Although S.Z. feared retaliation, Mrs. Minix made what the dis76
trict court termed “heroic efforts to protect her son.” She spoke
77
with staff and wrote to the juvenile judges. She attempted to meet
with the superintendent of one of the facilities, though she was pre78
vented from doing so by staff. She contacted the Deputy Depart79
ment of Corrections Commissioner and the Governor. Ultimately,
because of her efforts, S.Z. was “unexpectedly released on order from
80
the Governor’s office.”
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Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995); see also Anna Rapa, Comment,
One Brick Too Many: The Prison Litigation Reform Act as a Barrier to Legitimate Juvenile Lawsuits, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 263, 279 (2006).
No. 1:04-CV-447, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind. July 27, 2005).
Id. at *2.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
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Nonetheless, the district court dismissed the Minix family’s federal
claims under the PLRA’s exhaustion rule because S.Z. had not him81
self filed a grievance in the juvenile facility. At the time, the Indiana
juvenile grievance policy allowed incarcerated youths only two busi82
ness days to file a grievance.
Only two months after S.Z.’s suit was dismissed, the Civil Rights
Division of the U. S. Department of Justice concluded an investigation and confirmed that one of the Indiana facilities where S.Z. had
been assaulted, the South Bend Juvenile Facility, “fail[ed] to adequately protect the juveniles in its care from harm,” and violated the
83
constitutional rights of juveniles in its custody. The federal government further concluded that the grievance system that S.Z. was
faulted for not using was “dysfunctional” and “contribute[d] to the
84
State’s failure to ensure a reasonably safe environment.”
Incarcerated children and youths do not clog the courts with lawsuits, frivolous or otherwise. Though they are often incapable of
complying with the tight deadlines and complex requirements of internal correctional grievance systems, their lack of capacity should
not immunize abusive staff from the accountability that comes with
court oversight. Those under eighteen do not file many lawsuits, and
are not the source of any problem the PLRA is trying to solve. And
they are particularly poorly positioned to deal with its limits. They
should be exempted from its reach.
* * *
When federal courthouses are barred to constitutionally meritorious cases, the resulting harm is not merely to the affected prisoners
but to our entire system of accountability that ensures that government officials comply with constitutional mandates. The erection of
hurdles to accountability should not be seen as “reducing the burden” for correctional administrators—it should be recognized as
weakening the rule of law. The PLRA must be amended.
81
82

83

84

Id. at *7.
Id. at *3. Epilogue: The Minix family re-filed in state court, where the suit avoided exhaustion analysis because S.Z. was no longer incarcerated; the defendants once again removed the case to federal court, and this time the suit was permitted to go forward.
Minix v. Pazera, No. 3:06-CV-398, 2007 WL 4233455 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 28, 2007).
Letter from Bradley J. Schlozman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to
Mitch Daniels, Governor of the State of Ind. 3 (Sept. 9, 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/split_indiana_southbend_juv_findlet_9-905.pdf.
Id. at 7.

